Speeding, punishment, and recidivism - evidence from a regression discontinuity design by Gehrsitz, Markus
Gehrsitz, Markus (2017) Speeding, punishment, and recidivism - 
evidence from a regression discontinuity design. Journal of Law and 
Economics, 60 (3). pp. 497-528. ISSN 1537-5285 , 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/694844
This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/61623/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research 
outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the 
management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output.
Speeding, Punishment, and Recidivism
Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design ∗
Markus Gehrsitz†
August 18, 2017
Abstract
This paper estimates the effects of temporary driver’s license suspensions on driving
behavior. A little known rule in the German traffic penalty catalogue maintains that
drivers who commit a series of speeding transgressions within 365 days should have
their license suspended for one month. My regression discontinuity design exploits the
quasi-random assignment of license suspensions caused by the 365-days cut-off and
shows that 1-month license suspensions lower the probability of recidivating within a
year by 20 percent. This is largely a specific deterrence effect driven by the punishment
itself and not by incapacitation, information asymmetries, or the threat of stiffer future
penalties.
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1 Introduction
Worldwide, more than 1.2 million people die every year in traffic accidents (WHO,
2013). In 2010, traffic injuries in the US claimed the lives of 45,342 Americans and caused
medical and work loss costs of more than $100 billion. Motor vehicle crashes are the leading
cause of death for those aged 15 to 35 (CDC, 2015). Numerous laws and regulations, such
as mandatory seatbelt use, speed limits, and blood alcohol concentration (BAC) limits, have
been enacted in order to promote road safety. Most developed countries have an elaborate
penalty catalogue in place that aims to punish and deter traffic offenders. Temporary license
suspensions are a crucial component of these penalty catalogues. This measure not only
incapacitates traffic offenders by taking them off the streets for a short period of time. It is
also supposed to provide a “shot across the bows” by prompting offenders, who temporarily
experience the inconveniences of life without a driver’s license, to change their ways and
drive more responsibly once they get their license back.
Yet, little is known about the effectiveness of temporary license suspensions. Economic
theory provides a number of channels through which they may or may not affect driving
behaviour. Gary Becker’s (1968) model of the “rational criminal” predicts that temporary
license suspensions should only have long-run effects if they affect the degree of future penal-
ties and thus change the underlying cost-benefit trade-offs. The behavioral approach to the
economics of crime (Jolls et al., 1998, among others) offers other channels through which
temporary license suspensions might affect future behaviour even if they are one-off pun-
ishments. For instance, offenders might be backward-looking or might update their beliefs
about the actual cost of punishments and the probability that an offense is detected.
Ultimately, determining the effectiveness and the mechanisms through which penalties
affect criminal behaviour is, therefore, an empirical issue. As Levitt and Miles (2007) point
out, the main challenge for empiricists is to distinguish causation from correlation. A naive
comparison of the recidivism behavior of offenders who were punished for their criminal acts
with those who were not, cannot shed much light on the question of how effective penalties
are in deterring future crimes. After all, these penalties are not randomly assigned. People
who get punished because they committed a crime might be intrinsically prone to commit-
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ting crimes. Comparing their rates of recidivism to those of law abiding citizens is thus
an apples to oranges comparison. Traffic transgressions are no exception to this problem.
As shown below, a “naive” OLS regression yields a positive effect of license suspension on
recidivism even when conditioning on age, sex, and state fixed effects.
The goal of this study is to overcome these challenges in answering a seemingly simple
question. For that purpose, I exploit a rule in the German penalty catalogue for traffic
violations which leads to a quasi-random suspension of some individuals’ driver’s licenses.
This rule maintains that a person who commits two major speeding violations within 365
days, should have her license revoked for one month. This gives rise to a fuzzy regression
discontinuity design where those to the left of the 365-day cutoff are likely to have their
license revoked while those to the right of the cutoff retain theirs. The rule appears to be
complex enough to prevent sorting to the right of the threshold. At the same time, the
rule is very much enforced by the traffic authorities. Using rich administrative data, I find
that a loss of license for one month reduces the probability of recidivating within a year
by about 20 percent. The nature of the institutional framework also allows me to pinpoint
the mechanism through which the penalty operates and to disentangle the effect of license
suspensions from confounding punishments such as money fines and demerit points.
2 Background and Institutional Framework
Endogeneity issues in the relationship between punishment and criminal activity have
been recognized since at least the late 1990s (Levitt, 1996). Ever since, economists have come
up with various strategies to exploit sources of exogenous variation in order to isolate causal
effects of punishment on recidivism. Kessler and Levitt (1999) exploit sentence enhance-
ments that are exogenously induced by California’s Proposition 8 to evaluate the effect of
harsher sentences on crime. They find that harsher punishments reduce crime substantially.
Helland and Tabarrok (2007) utilize idiosyncrasies in the same state’s three strike policy to
isolate a large and significant deterrence effect of the policy. Lee and McCrary (2017) use
the fact that juvenile criminals tend to be sentenced as adults once they turn eighteen, and
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find only small deterrence effects of more severe penalties.
Drago et al. (2009) and Barbarino and Mastrobuoni (2014) analyze sentence reductions
for certain parts of the Italian prison population due to a collective clemency bill. Their re-
sults suggest that a reduction in prison sentences actually reduced recidivism. Di Tella and
Schargrodsky (2013) use Argentinian judges’ ideological differences as an instrument in eval-
uating the effectiveness of electronic monitoring compared to incarceration. They find that
this more lenient treatment reduces recidivism. Green and Winik (2010), Snodgrass et al.
(2011) and Aizer and Doyle (2015) exploit the random assignment of criminals to judges with
different incarceration tendencies (an identification strategy pioneered by Kling (2006)) and
find that juvenile imprisonment increases recidivism probabilities and has adverse effects on
human capital accumulation.
It is surprising how little research has been devoted to natural experiments in the area
of traffic violations. After all, traffic fatalities are an enormous social problem. By way of
comparison, more than ten times as many people died in vehicle crashes in Germany than
were murdered in 2015. What is more, previous estimates regarding the effectiveness of
punishments for property or violent crimes are unlikely to apply to traffic offenses which
tend to unintentionally lead to damages and casualties. One reason for a lack of research in
this area, is that the effects of incapacitation, of the mere threat of punishments, and of the
punishment itself are hard to disentangle. Moreover, punishment usually consist of a mix
of penalties. For example, the best study to date on the effect of penalties on road safety
by Hansen (2015) is only able to isolate the combined reduced form effect of money fines,
increases in insurance premia, license suspensions, home releases, and jail time in response
to committing a driving under the influence (DUI) offense.1
My study therefore significantly advances the literature: rich administrative data en-
able me to estimate not only reduced form effects, but to also obtain a local average treatment
effect. In other words, this is the first study to assess the effect of a punishment for traffic
offenses on recidivism, as opposed to the effect of being assigned to punishment. Moreover,
the nature of my natural experiment allows me to distinguish the effect of a 1-month driver’s
1Studies by DeAngelo and Hansen (2014), de Figueiredo (2015) and Traxler et al. (2017) are the only
other papers that I am aware of to find plausibly causal effects of penalties and/or enforcement on road
safety.
4
license suspension from the confounding effects of other “treatments”, such as money fines
and demerit points which are usually also part of a penalty mix. Finally, the institutional
setting allows me to credibly isolate the specific deterrence effect of the punishment from
the general deterrence impact and the effect of incapacitation.
My source of exogenous variation stems from an idiosyncrasy in the German traffic
penalty catalogue. This catalogue generally provides for three different types of penalties:
money fines, (demerit) points entered into one’s central traffic registry account, and license
suspensions. The degree of the penalty is determined by the seriousness of the offense.2
Small transgressions are fined with small financial penalties. For more severe transgressions,
points in the central traffic registry are added. Points received for different transgressions
and different types of transgressions accumulate. If a person does not commit a transgres-
sion for two years, all points are erased. If a person does commit a transgression within two
years, however, new points are added to the existing stock and the two year expungement
period starts afresh. An offender permanently loses her license once her stock of points rises
to 18. Finally, for severe transgressions, temporary license suspensions are handed out on
top of points and money fines. For instance, a person speeding 45 km/h over the limit will
have her license suspended for 1 month. The penalty catalogue also distinguishes between
offenses that took place on highways and offenses that took place in built-up areas, for ex-
ample residential neighborhoods. Fines differ in severity for different types of transgressions
ranging from aggravated DUIs to driving without appropriate snow chains.
The road traffic law (BKatV), which constitutes the legal basis for the penalty cata-
logue, has multiple additional provisions. One additional provision is for “persistent delin-
quencies.” It maintains that “a temporary license suspension [of usually 1 month] shall
ordinarily be handed out if the operator of a motor vehicle commits a speeding transgression
of at least 26 km/h within 1 year after another speeding transgression of at least 26km/h
has been committed and the corresponding penalty has obtained legal force” (§4 Abs. 2 Satz
2 BKatV; own translation). This provision will henceforth be referred to as the “365-day
rule.” For instance, a person who within a few months is caught twice exceeding the speed
2Table A1 in the Appendix provides an excerpt from the penalty catalogue, specifically for speeding
offenses.
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limit on a highway by 28 km/h falls under the 365-day rule and will have her license tem-
porarily revoked even though, according to the penalty catalogue, she should on aggregate
only be fined e160 and receive 6 demerit points (see Table A1). Note that the wording of
the provision is tricky. If you read the above text carefully, you will notice that the period,
in which an offender is at risk of falling under the 365-day rule, only begins after the penalty
for the first transgression “has obtained legal force.” The difference between the date of the
transgression and the date on which the associated penalty obtains legal force might seem
minor at first yet the median difference between those two dates is 66 days. In other words,
the day count which determines whether an offender has her license suspended due to the
365-day rule does not start immediately after committing the first transgression but with a
substantial time lag. This wrinkle in the law is a big source of confusion among offenders and
- as we will see in Section 4 - prevents sorting to the right of the 365-day threshold. Fortu-
nately, both the date of a transgressions and the date on which the corresponding penalties
obtain legal force are recorded in the data, so I can properly ascertain which offenders fall
under the rule.
The 365-day rule provides a cutoff that can be exploited in a regression discontinuity
setting. For instance, this rule requires that a person who commits her second transgression
within 365 days after the penalty for the initial transgression has obtained legal force, should
have her licenses suspended for one month. A person who commits her second transgression
on day 366 should keep her license. By comparing the recidivism behavior of these two groups
of people, who should be very similar except for the degree of the penalty they receive, I
can obtain an unbiased estimate of the effect of a 1-month driver’s license suspension. My
identification strategy rests on two assumptions that need to be met to guarantee internally
valid estimates. First, drivers by and large must not be aware of this regulation or, at the
very least, they should not gear their driving behavior accordingly. Data and statistical tests
(McCrary, 2008) presented in Section 4 will support this assumption and will show that sort-
ing to either side of the 365-day cutoff is not common, most likely because the wording of
the provision is not straightforward. Second, traffic authorities must enforce this regulation.
It is apparent from the above quote that the authorities only “shall ordinarily” hand out
licenses suspension and thus have considerable wiggle room. But, Section 4 will also show
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that the authorities to a great degree adhere to this rule, thus creating a discontinuity in the
assignment of drivers to license suspensions.
3 Data
The source of data for this study is the German central traffic registry (“Verkehrszen-
tralregister” or VZR). The VZR is administered and maintained by the Federal Motor Trans-
port Authority (“Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt” or KBA). The VZR contains an account with a
unique ID for every traffic offender who has committed a transgression that was sanctioned
with at least one demerit point. Offenses are usually first recorded by local traffic author-
ities. These local agencies (or in some instances the courts) then transmit information on
the date and type of transgression as well as the corresponding penalty to the KBA. The
transmissions also contain information about the date on which a penalty obtains legal force.
The VZR is an active registry. Persons who do not commit a traffic transgression for
two years not only get their points total set to zero, but are erased entirely from the data
base. If someone commits a transgression after her account has been erased due to this
2-year expungement period, she starts with a clean slate. That is, she receives a new ID and
cannot be linked to former VZR entries. The point system was reformed on 1 May 2014. On
this occasion, a dataset containing the VZR population as of 30 April 2014 was created. The
KBA made an anonymized version of this excerpt available for on-site analysis. The data
set contains more than 10.5 million entries pertaining to about 6.3 million distinct offenders.
Obviously not all observations in this dataset can be used for this study. For one, a
sufficiently large follow-up period is required since my main outcome of interest is recidivism.
More importantly, this study isolates exogeneous variation in the severity of punishment to
assess the effect of license suspensions on recidivism. That is, only offenders who have a
chance to be affected by the 365-day rule should be used for analysis. The following steps
describe the selection process that identifies observations that become part of my “experi-
ment.”
First, it should be noted that the 365-day rule only applies to speeding transgressions of
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26km/h or more. More precisely, a 1-month license suspension may be imposed on speeders
whose offense by itself would not have resulted in a license suspensions. There are two cases
that qualify for this rule: speeding 26-40 km/h above the limit on highways and speeding
26-30 km/h above the limit in built-up areas. Second, the rule can only affect persons who
have previously committed another speeding transgression of 26km/h or more. Throughout
this article, I refer to the earlier of these two transgressions as the “original transgression”
and to the second transgression as the “treatment transgression.” When I refer to the time
difference between the treatment and the original transgression, I am referring to the number
of days that have passed between the date on which the penalty for the original transgression
obtained legal force and the date of the treatment transgression. In other words, through-
out this paper, I account for the wrinkle in the law that delays the start of the day count.
Only persons who have both an original transgression and a treatment transgression (that is
two speeding offenses of 26km/h or more) can enter the final “discontinuity sample”. I also
require the time difference between both transgressions to be no more than 545 days and at
least 186 days. In essence, this puts a 180-day window around the 365-day threshold that
determines whether a 1-month driver’s license suspension is issued. I assess the robustness
of my results to different time windows around the cutoff in Section 5.
The outcome of interest is recidivism, namely the probability of committing yet an-
other (third) offense. This requires a sufficiently large post-treatment time window. This
time window has to be even larger since it can take a few months for transgressions to show
up in the data. For example, offenders may appeal against prescribed penalties in court.
Transmission to the KBA and recording information into the VZR also takes some time. On
average, it takes about two months from the date of the actual offense until it shows up in
the data base, after 5 months more than 99% of incidents actually show up in the data. My
observational period ends on 30 April 2014. Accounting for an at-most 5 month delay and in
order to evaluate a 12 months recidivism window, only offenders who have committed their
treatment transgression before 1 December 2012 can be used in this analysis.
Another complication arises from the 2-year expungement period. Individuals who do
not commit a traffic transgression for two years are erased from the data set. By inversion,
individuals who still are in the data base must have committed an offense in the past two
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years. That is, individuals who committed an offense before 1 May 2012 must necessarily
have committed another offense subsequently. For these individuals there will thus be no
variation in the outcome. As a result, individuals whose treatment transgression predates
May 1 2012 also need to be excluded from the discontinuity sample. The appendix, in partic-
ular Figure A1, provides additional information regarding the generation of my final sample.
Once these restrictions have been imposed, a “discontinuity sample” emerges. It con-
sists of 31,400 persons. Each person has a treatment transgression that occurred between
1 May 2012 and 30 November 2012; each person also has a original transgression for which
the date on which the corresponding penalty has obtained legal force predates the date of
the treatment transgression by at least 186 days and at most 545 days. For about half the
sample, 365 days or less passed between these two points in time. Borrowing terminology
from the potential outcome framework (Angrist et al., 1996), these observations constitute
the “treatment group”. Members of this group fall under the 365-day-rule and should have
their licenses suspended for 1 month. The remainder of the discontinuity sample constitute
the “control group”. Members of this group have committed similar transgressions but due
to the timing of their offenses mostly retain their driver’s license. Persons in both treatment
and control group may or may not recidivate, that is may or may not have committed a
(third) major traffic transgression after their treatment transgressions.
If the descriptive statistics of Table 1 are any indication, it appears as if license sus-
pensions have an effect. Rates of recidivism are 24.4% and 26.5% for the treatment and
control group, respectively. These differences are statistically significant at the 1% level (see
row 10 and columns (1) and (2) of Table 1). The difference actually tends to increase the
more I limit the sample to observations with treatment transgressions closer to the 365-day
threshold. On the other hand, demographic factors that are reported with the data are quite
balanced across treatment and control group, indicating a quasi-random separation of the
sample. For instance, the average age in the treatment sample is 42.66 years, in the control
sample it is 43.02. The null hypothesis that there is no difference in means cannot be rejected
at the 1% level. The means for all other covariates are also very similar, and formal t-tests
for differences in means fail to reject the null in the vast majority of instances.
I also distinguish between speeding-specific recidivism and general recidivism. The two
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bottom rows of Table 1 provide the corresponding means and standard deviations. Since
1-month license suspensions are quasi-randomly assigned due to a speeding incidence, one
might hypothesize that speeding recidivism is particularly deterred. This turns out to not
be the case, in fact speeding-specific recidivism is just as much affected as overall recidivism
(for example DUIs, speeding, running a red light, and so on). All results for speeding-specific
recidivism are therefore relegated to the appendix of this paper.
4 Methods
The goal of this study is to exploit the exogeneous variation in penalties induced by
the 365-day rule. The rule maintains that a 1-month license suspension shall be levied on
offenders who - accounting for the wrinkle in the law that delays the start of the day count
- commit two major speeding transgressions within 365 days, but not on those who commit
two such transgressions within 366 days or more. This will allow for the identification of
the causal effect of a temporary license suspension on the probability of reoffending. My
identification strategy will only be valid if the 365-day rule is actually applied and results in
a discontinuity in the assignment to treatment. Figure 1 illustrates that this is indeed the
case. The x-axis shows the running variable, the number of days that have passed between
the date on which the penalty for the original transgression has obtained legal force and
the date of the treatment transgression. For each bin, I calculate the fraction of offenders
within that bin who have had their license suspended for 1 month. The position of each
point relative to the y-axis yields information about these fractions.
If the 365-day rule was strictly applied, everybody to the left of the red vertical line
should have her license suspended for 1 month in addition to the prescribed money and point
penalties. Everybody to the right or on the line should keep their license and merely suffer
the prescribed money and point penalties. Such a “sharp” separation into treatment and
control group is not present in this case. There is, however, a big drop in the probability of
having one’s license temporary revoked at day 366. To the left of the cutoff around three
quarters of offenders lose their license for 1 month and to the right of the cutoff a mere 1.7
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percent of offenders are hit with a 1-month license suspension. In other words, there is a huge
drop in the probability of having one’s license suspended due to the treatment transgression
once 365 days have passed since the penalty for the original transgression obtained legal force.
Likely reasons for receiving the treatment on the “wrong” side of the cutoff are involvement
in an accident or repeat offending in terms of non-speeding transgressions.3 The reasons
for imperfect compliance on the left hand side are numerous. In instances very close to the
cutoff, judges may be sympathetic to appeals and choose to not invoke the 365-day rule. The
same might be true in cases of hardship, for example for elderly or disabled drivers who have
no other means of transportation than their vehicles. Similarly, offenders from rural areas,
commuters who are dependent on their car, or professional truck drivers might be able to
keep their licenses. In general, any penalty notice can be appealed in court and judges may
override a suspension if the offender shows remorse or accepts a higher monetary and/or
point penalty in lieu of the temporary license suspension. Note that this kind of selection
is not a threat to my identification strategy. Rather it illustrates the local interpretation of
any regression discontinuity coefficient.4
By and large, traffic authorities follow the 365-day rule which induces a big drop in the
probability of having one’s license temporarily suspended at the expected threshold. The
suspension is also indeed for exactly one month. In the data, there were only 6 instances
in which a 2 months suspension was imposed and 1 case in which a 3 months suspension
was imposed due to aggravating circumstances. These observations were dropped from the
data. Figure 2 plots the recidivism outcome of interest against the number of days that
have passed between the date on which the penalty for the original transgression obtained
legal force and the date of the treatment transgression. The running variable is aggregated
into 3-day bins. The size of each circle indicates the number of observations in each bin.
The position of each circle, relative to the y-axis, indicates the fraction of offenders within
a bin who recidivated within 12 months. The recidivism period is extended to 13 months
for those who actually have had their license suspended for 1 month in order to account for
3It is noticeable that cases in which exactly 366 days have passed between the original transgression and
the treatment transgressions have their licenses suspended more frequently than most other cases to the
right of the cutoff. The reason is that 2012 was a leap year which has led to confusion among the local traffic
authorities as to whether these cases should fall under the 365-day rule.
4This issue will be further discussed in Section 7.
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incapacitation effects as drivers without a license naturally have less of an opportunity to
re-offend.5
In Figure 2 there is clearly a discontinuity at the 366-day cutoff. This jump yields a
first rough estimate of the reduced form (intent-to-treat) effect. The graph suggests that
offenders who are assigned to treatment (license suspensions) are three to four percentage
points less likely to recidivate than offenders who are not assigned to treatment. Note that
the lowess lines in both figures are merely superimposed to better visualize the pattern in
the data but may very well suffer from boundary bias close to the 365-day cutoff. In order to
obtain a visual estimate of the size of the treatment effect it is more important to focus on
the position of the cloud of points, especially around the cutoff, than to study the position
of the lowess lines at the boundary.6
Figures 1 and 2 make a compelling case that a) the 365-day rule invokes a quasi-random
assignment of license suspensions and b) this assignment indeed has an effect on future
recidivism behavior. However, the internal validity of any coefficient obtained through this
setup would be in jeopardy if offenders were very much aware of the 365-day cutoff and
geared their driving behavior accordingly. Fortunately, there is little indication that this is
the case. First, anecdotal evidence suggests that the vast majority of drivers is not even
aware of this rule. There is a vast amount of online forums in which repeat offenders who
fall under the 365-day rule express their shock about their license suspensions. Second, the
wrinkle in the provision that starts the day count only after the penalty for the original
transgression has obtained legal force, makes it hard for offenders to keep track of whether
they are still at risk of falling under the 365-day rule. That is, if they were aware of the
exact wording of the law to begin with.
Data back up this claim. If at least some drivers were aware of the 365-day rule
and all its wrinkles, and were able to keep track of the exact day count, one would expect
“bunching” on the right-hand side of the 365-day cutoff. Drivers would drive more carefully
than usual until the 365-day rule no longer applied to them. This would result in a spike
5It should also be noted that the treated group have to deposit their license for one month at the local
traffic authority within 4 months of the date on which the punishment takes legal effect, but I do not observe
the exact dates on which they turn in their license.
6Figure A2 in the Appendix repeats this analysis for speeding-specific recidivism. The relative magnitude
of the jump is very similar.
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of traffic transgressions on days 366-400. Yet Figure 3 gives little indication that this is
indeed the case. The frequency of treatment transgressions (in 3-day bins) is very evenly
distributed with around 100 transgressions per day on each side of the cutoff. Most notably,
there is no spike in treatment transgressions from offenders whose penalties for their original
transgression obtained legal force just a bit more than 365 days ago. One might be mildly
concerned about the small drop in the transgression frequency on days 360-362. Yet, the
frequency rebounds to above-average levels on days 363-365. Drops in frequency of even
greater magnitude can also be observed elsewhere in the distribution. This visual analysis is
consistent with McCrary’s (2008) more explicit density test for manipulation at the cutoff.
The test implies a log difference in height of -.021 with a standard error of 0.033. In other
words, the null hypothesis that there is no manipulation at the cutoff cannot be rejected at
any reasonable level of significance. Frandsen (2017) has pointed out that McCrary’s (2008)
density test might be inconsistent for discrete running variables, such as the day count in
this application. He has developed a test with preferable finite sample properties for such a
scenario. Frandsen’s (2017) test yields a p-value of 0.224, thus confirming that manipulation
at the cutoff is unlikely. By and large, there is no indication of any bunching or any increase
in frequency just to the right of the cutoff.
A related threat to the internal validity of the design is differential sorting of offenders
to either side of the cutoff. For instance, more experienced or habitual offenders might be
more knowledgeable about the penalty catalogue and the 365-day provision and might sort
to the right of the cutoff. The data, however, give little indication that this is indeed the
case. Figure 4 plots the average number of prior offenses in 3-day bins against the running
variable. There is no indication for either a jump or drop around the 365-day threshold.7
Overall, there is no indication of any sorting behavior. This suggests that the 365-day
rule is obscure enough to lead to a random separation of offenders into a treatment and
control group, yet it is enforced to such a degree that the take-up among those who are
assigned to treatment is substantially higher than among those not assigned to a 1-month
driver’s license suspension. This gives rise to a fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) design
7Figures A4a and A4b in the Appendix also fail to detect a break for average age - another good proxy
for driving experience - or the percentage of female drivers in each 3-day bin.
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which is implemented as a 2SLS instrumental variable regression. When picking a functional
form, we want to be sure that what at first glance certainly looks like a jump in recidivism
rates at the 366-day cutoff is not just a non-linearity in the data. A visual inspection of
a graph that plots the outcome of interest against the running variable (such as Figure 2)
provides a useful guide for picking the correct functional form. The graph reveals no obvious
non-linearities. Not least for efficiency reasons, a linear functional form therefore seems to
be appropriate. Nonetheless, I will also consider specifications using second and third order
polynomials of the running variable and interactions of these polynomials with the treatment
dummy. Gelman and Imbens (2014) show that polynomials of even higher order do more
harm than good and even the cubic version of the model might be too much. It is still useful
as a robustness check.
An alternative is a nonparametric approach, for example local linear regression. Lee
and Card (2008), however, argue that with a discrete running variable, such a nonparametric
approach is not advisable. My running variable, the number of days between the original
and the treatment transgression, is discrete but takes on many distinct values which should
mitigate concerns about the nonparametric approach. Nonetheless, this method is only used
as a robustness check. Section 5 will show that it leads to results that are strikingly similar
to those of the least flexible parametric specification. Lee and Lemieux (2010) also suggest
that the standard errors should be clustered on the distinct values of a discrete running
variable which is done throughout the paper. The second stage regression in my 2SLS model
is modeled as follows:
Reci = β0 + β1Xi + (β2X
2
i + β3X
3
i ) + γ0Dˆi + γ1DˆiXi(+γ2DˆiX
2
i + γ3DˆiX
3
i ) + ǫi (1)
where Xi is the running variable, that is the number of days that have passed between the
date on which the penalty for the original transgression obtained legal force and the date of
the treatment transgression of offender i. As is best practice in an RD setting (Lee, 2008),
the running variable is centered around the cutoff. Di is a dummy indicating whether, due to
the treatment transgression, offender i had her license suspended for 1 month. This dummy
is instrumented for (see below) thus the hat-superscript in equation (1). Reci is a dummy
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equal to one if offender i recidivates and commits a (third) offense within 12 months after
the treatment transgression.8 γ0 is the coefficient of interest and yields the treatment effect
of a 1-month license suspension on the probability of recidivating within a year. In order to
assess more flexible functional forms, the polynomials and interaction terms in parentheses
can be added to the model. Since assignment to treatment is fuzzy, a first stage regression,
yielding the predicted values Dˆi, is necessary:
Di = δ0 + δ1Xi + (δ2X
2
i + δ3X
3
i ) + π0Ti + π1TiXi(+π2TiX
2
i + π3TiX
3
i ) + ηi (2)
where Ti = 1(Xi < 366). In other words, Ti indicates assignment to treatment and Di
indicates whether the treatment was in fact taken up. Of course, in the specifications using
higher order polynomials, the first stage is constructed such that the model is exactly iden-
tified and { Di, DiXi, DiX
2
i , DiX
3
i } are instrumented for by { Ti, TiXi, TiX
2
i , TiX
3
i }.
All models are also run with a vector of covariates included in the regression. Controls
are offender i’s age, sex, her number of prior offenses, and regional dummies for her place
of residence. This provides an additional check on the internal validity of my estimates.
The covariates are balanced across treatment and control group so that the point estimates
should not be affected by the inclusion of control variables. We will see in the next section
that this is indeed the case.
5 Results
The reduced form results of Table 2 yield the intent-to-treat (ITT) effect, that is the
effect of assignment to treatment. Offenders who committed their treatment transgression
within 365 days after the penalty for the original transgression had obtained legal force, are
about three percentage points less likely to recidivate within 12 months than offenders who
do not fall under the 365-day rule. This finding is robust to the inclusion of covariates.
8As mentioned above, the evaluated recidivism period is extended to 13 months for those who actually
receive the treatment in order to account for incapacitation effects as drivers without a license naturally have
less of an opportunity to reoffend.
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Changes to the functional form also have no effect on the point estimates, but result in
small losses of precision. The average rate of recidivism is 25.4 percent, so these coefficients
translate into a decrease in the rate of recidivism of about 12 percent. This result is also
consistent with a visual analysis of Figure 2 which illustrates the ITT and would suggest an
effect size of a similar magnitude.9
Second stage instrumental variable estimates for the effect of a 1-month license sus-
pension on the probability of recidivating within 12 months are reported in Table 3. The
linear model without any controls suggests that a 1-month license suspension reduces the
probability of committing a major traffic transgression within the next year by 5 percentage
points. Adding covariate controls does not alter this point estimate substantially. A model
containing an additional quadratic term of the running variable and its interaction with
the suspension indicator comes to virtually the same result. The coefficient is -.052 with a
standard error of .021, and it is also robust to the inclusion of covariates. A cubic model
yields similar results with a coefficient of -.057 and a standard error of .024. Given a mean
recidivism rate of 25.4 percent, these coefficients translate into reductions in recidivating
behavior by 19 to 22 percent.
Columns (3) through (10) assess the robustness of my results to picking an ever smaller
time window around the 365-day cutoff. For instance, column (3) focuses on offenders who
committed their treatment transgression between 276 and 455 days after the penalties for
their original transgressions had obtained legal force. In essence, this creates a 90-day window
to both sides of the 365-day cutoff. It is comforting to see that the point estimates remain
very stable. If we further zoom in on the cutoff, the point estimates continue to hover around
-.05. Not surprisingly, the standard errors inflate substantially as would be expected since
the sample size shrinks with an ever closer window around the cutoff. Wooldridge (2009)
also points out that there are more than just efficiency costs to limiting the sample to obser-
vations just around the cutoff. His simulations show that this might substantially bias the
coefficient of interest. Therefore, the specification that uses the full sample (column (2)) is
9The reduced form results for speeding-specific recidivism are very similar in magnitude and are available
from the author upon request.
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the preferred specification.10
The results are also robust to different functional forms. Both quadratic and cubic
specifications yield point estimates that are very similar to those of the linear specification.
If we discount the findings from columns (9) and (10) which will likely suffer from both
consistency and efficiency issues, the coefficient range stretches from -0.029 to -0.071 and is
thus hovering around the preferred -.048 estimate yielded by the linear specification using
covariates and the full discontinuity sample.11 The second stage results are also strikingly
different from what a “naive” OLS regression would imply. Appendix Table A3 shows that
such an analysis would suggest a positive relationship between punishment and recidivism
even after accounting for observable driver characteristics such as age, sex and state fixed-
effects. In other words, the difference between correlations yielded by a naive OLS model
and the plausibly causal effects of a regression discontinuity design turns out to be very
substantial and illustrates the value added by design-based studies.
Finally, I also experiment with nonparametric local linear regression which assigns
more weight to observations close to the threshold and sidesteps functional form issues.
However, these advantages come at the cost of a loss of precision and should be viewed
with some scrutiny when applied to a discrete running variable as in this study (Lee and
Card, 2008). It is nonetheless comforting that Table 4 demonstrates that a nonparametric
approach suggests that a 1-month license suspension reduces recidivism by 4.6 percentage
points, an estimate that is virtually identical to the one yielded of my preferred parametric
specification in column (2) of Table 3. This result is robust to different bandwidth selections.
In fact, the two most popular algorithms by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and Calonico
et al. (2014) respectively yield identical point estimates with differences in the number of
observations used explaining differences in precision.12
10The results for speeding-specific recidivism are presented in Table A2 of the Appendix. They are similar
in magnitude but - not surprisingly - less precise and therefore not quite as robust to changes in specification.
11I also conducted a Chi-Squared (Wald) version of the formal specification test suggested by Lee and
Lemieux (2010). For this test, a set of dummies for 3-day bins of the running variable is added to the 2SLS
regression. The p-values for a test for joint significance of these variables are reported below each coefficient
in Table 3 and suggest that a linear version should be preferred not least for efficiency reasons.
12Appendix Figure A6a further tests for sensitivity with respect to bandwidth choice by plotting point
estimates and 95% confidence intervals over a wide range of possible bandwidths. The point estimates all
hover around -.05 and most of them are statistically significant at the 5% level. Similarly the point estimates
for speeding-specific recidivism all hover around -.03 (see Figure A6b).
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6 Mechanisms: Specific or General Deterrence
The key finding of this paper is that temporary driver’s license suspensions substan-
tially reduce recidivism. Yet, it is important to also pin down the mechanism through which
punishment works. Criminologists broadly distinguish between specific and general deter-
rence. Nagin (2013) defines general deterrence as the effect of the “threat of punishment
[that] may discourage criminal acts.” Specific deterrence, on the other hand, refers to the
impact of the actual experience of the punishment.
Moreover, in the context of this paper’s identification strategy, simply learning about
the 365-day rule might be another mechanism that could plausibly drive the results, but
would limit their external validity. I vary the size of the recidivism time window to shed
some light on this channel. The 2-year expungement period, the lag between transgression
date and data entry, and the fact that treated offenders have 4 months to turn in their licenses
limit the range of recidivism windows that can reasonably be evaluated to 6-15 months. In
each case, the recidivism window for the treated is extended by an additional month to ac-
count for incapacitation effects. Figure 5 shows means-adjusted coefficients and confidence
intervals for recidivism windows ranging from six to fifteen months. All results are obtained
from a set of linear parametric regressions using covariates. The effect of a 1-month license
suspension is statistically significant, negative, and notably stable over time although the
point estimates are slightly larger for longer time windows. By and large, Figure 5 indicates
that a 1-month license suspension reduces both short-run and long-run rates of recidivism
by about 20 percent. This is not due to a short-run incapacitation effect but rather suggests
that offenders are permanently deterred from committing traffic transgressions.13
This similarity and the general persistence of the effect indicate that the reduction in
recidivism is not driven by the fact that the treatment group - as a result of being pun-
ished under the 365-day rule - simply becomes better informed about the peculiarities of the
365-day rule. Figure 6 provides additional evidence against this mechanism. The day count
starts all over again for offenders who had their license suspended due to falling under the
365-day rule. In other words, these offenders are at risk of falling under the 365-day rule
13Similarly, Figure A7 suggests an effect range similar to the main results for speeding-specific recidivism.
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for a second time. At the same time, these offenders should now be acutely aware of the
specifics of the rule. If learning about the rule was a major driver of the observed reduction
in recidivism, one would expect bunching to the right of the 365-day threshold between the
time at which the penalty for the treatment transgression obtained legal force and the third
transgression. Yet, this does not appear to be the case. McCrary’s (2008) and Frandsen’s
(2017) formal tests confirm that there is indeed no evidence for manipulation around the
cutoff.14
The case for general deterrence is also unconvincing. A license-suspension under the
365-day rule is a one-off punishment and has no legal implications for the stiffness of future
penalties. In other words, the legal status of those just to the right of the cut-off is no
different from the legal status of those to the left. Offenders in both groups have received
the same penalty in terms of demerit points and money fines. Offenders in both groups will
receive identical penalties for future transgressions. Furthermore, the institutional setting
in which transgressions are recorded and speeding tickets are issued is such that it prevents
police and traffic officials from giving preferential treatment to “unlucky” offenders who
happened to land just to the left of the 365-days cut-off and went on to commit another
traffic transgression. When enforcing speed limits, police officers generally do not pull over
speeders but instead use sophisticated measuring equipment that records a driver’s speed
and takes a picture of both the driver and the license plate. This information is then au-
tomatically transmitted to the responsible authorities, matched to an offender’s file, and a
ticket is issued. Put differently, in the eyes of the law and law enforcement, no distinction
between the treated and untreated can be made.15
All signs, therefore, point towards a specific deterrence effect, in which offenders are
backward looking and become less likely to recidivate because they experienced the punish-
ment. Table 5 provides some evidence for this hypothesis. It distinguishes between three
groups of offenders: the treated who fell under the 365-day rule and indeed had their license
suspended for 1 month; non-compliers who also fell under the rule but got to keep their
14The covariates are also balanced around the cutoff, a corresponding tabulation is available from the
author upon request.
15Neither are insurance premiums differentially affected across treatment and control groups as German
data protection laws prohibit the KBA from transmitting detailed driving history information to insurance
companies.
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license; and the untreated who committed their second treatment transgression more than
365 days after the penalty for the original transgression had obtained legal force and hence
also kept their license. The treated experienced both the punishment and learn about the
365-day rule. The non-compliers, on the other hand do not experience the punishment,
but since they had to wriggle their way out of the license suspension, they are just as well
informed about the 365-day rule as the treated. In other words, the statistically significant
difference in recidivism, shown in the first row of Panel A in Table 5 cannot be explained
by an information advantage. It should, however, be noted that this comparison no longer
takes place in the realm of a randomized setting, as the non-compliers are a self-selected
group. Nonetheless, descriptive statistics for treated and non-compliers are reasonably sim-
ilar. For example, Panel A shows no statistically significant differences in the number of
prior transgressions in either group. There is, however, a very substantial and statistically
significant difference in the rate of recidivism which is 23.8 percent for the treated and 26.1
for non-compliers. In this the non-compliers also very much resemble the untreated who
exhibit a recidivism rate of 26.4 percent.16
Panel B presents another piece of evidence in favour of a specific deterrence mechanism.
It lists the fractions of different types of (third) speeding offenses that were committed by
each group within 365 days after the penalty for the treatment transgression obtained legal
force. Remember, that the 365-day rule only applies if speed limits are exceeded by 26-40
km/h (26-30km/h for built-up areas), but not if the limit is exceeded by less than that. For
violations of the limit by more than 40km/h, license suspensions are issued regardless of the
timing of the offense. Hence, if learning about the 365-day rule was driving the results, one
would expect the treated and non-compliers to less frequently commit transgressions in the
26-40km/h range than the (presumably ignorant) untreated and to bunch in the 21-25 km/h
range. Yet, there is no statistically significant difference in the fraction of third offenses in
the 26-40km/h range across these three groups.
16Another specific deterrence mechanism might operate through enhanced penalties for driving without
license. Such an offense would be flagged in the data and indeed none of the treated offenders in my sample
are caught engaging in this behavior in their incapacitation month.
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7 Conclusion
The impact of punishment on future criminal behavior has always been very hard to
measure. Heavy penalties are usually only handed out to offenders who have committed
serious crimes. Their recidivism rates are higher to begin with and the effect of punishment
cannot easily be distinguished from the effect of unobservable characteristics of these offend-
ers such as a lower risk aversion or self-control issues. This article has exploited a special
provision in the German traffic law that results in a quasi-random assignment of 1-month
driver’s license suspensions to some traffic offenders but not to others. Using a fuzzy re-
gression discontinuity design, I find that receiving the punishment reduces the probability of
committing another offense within a year by about 20 percent. This effect is unlikely to be
explained by information asymmetries or incapacitation. It indicates that traffic offenders
are to some extent backward-looking and react to the punishment itself rather than to the
mere threat of future punishment. In other words, temporary license suspensions appear
have a large specific deterrent effect.
This, of course, is a “local” effect in two ways. First, it is local in the sense that the es-
timated effect is best interpreted as the effect on offenders with values of the running variable
close to the 365-day cutoff. Yet, as the summary statistics in Table 1 show, there are few
observable differences between offenders close and further away from the cutoff which leaves
some room for generalizations. Second, a fuzzy RD design is implemented using instrumental
variable analysis. As a result, I obtain a Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE), that is
the effect for compliers. This is the group of people who only because they fell under the
365-day rule, had their license suspended for one month but would not have had their license
suspended otherwise. The 365-day rule by its very nature only applies to repeat offenders
who have committed two fairly serious speeding offenses. A 1-month license suspension may
affect other types of offenders, for example first-time offenders, in a different way. Indeed,
compared to the population of one-time offenders, my experimental sample is on average
about 2 years younger and contains about twice the proportion of men.17 The population of
habitual offenders is, however, clearly the population that is the most interesting to policy
17A detailed table of summary statistics that compares the observable characteristics of one-time offenders
and repeat-offenders is available from the author upon request.
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makers so that my results might very well be seen as a case of “sometimes-you-get-what-
you-want” (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
The results of this article also have implications for the economic theory of crime.
Driver’s license suspensions due to the 365-day rule have no effect on the degree of penalties
for future transgressions. As a result, they should not have an effect on the cost-benefit
trade-off that rational criminals face in Becker’s (1968) framework. Yet, this study provides
compelling evidence that receiving such a penalty alters future behavior. My findings are
thus more indicative of a backward-looking criminal who changes his ways due to a pun-
ishment he has already received. This finding is consistent with recent evidence on drunk
driving (Hansen, 2015) which suggests that bounded rationality might predispose traffic of-
fenders to being responsive to penalties and that much of this response operates through
the specific deterrence channel. My study confirms this finding and shows that first-hand
experience of penalties in general and license suspensions in particular are powerful tools for
crime prevention. As such, these results are of great interest to policy makers who, as of now,
have little reliable evidence regarding the effectiveness of penalties. This study suggests that
taking offenders who were speeding, texting while driving, or drunk driving off the streets
for a short period of time not only incapacitates them but has lasting effects on their driving
behavior.18 As a result, tweaks to penalty catalogues towards a more frequent imposition of
temporary license suspensions are likely to offer large benefits in terms of avoided crashes,
fatalities, and medical costs.
18A back of the envelope calculation suggests that starting to impose 1-month license suspensions for all
speeding offenses in the 21-40km/h range, would cut the number of offenses by 160,000 through the specific
deterrence channel alone.
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Table 2: Reduced Form Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean Rate of Recidivism (Any) 0.254
(SD) (0.183)
Below Cutoff −0.033∗∗ −0.031∗∗ −0.033∗∗ −0.031∗ −0.032∗ −0.032∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
Observations 31,400 31,383 31,400 31,383 31,400 31,383
Convariates No Yes No Yes No Yes
Model Linear Linear Quadratic Quadratic Cubic Cubic
Notes:
+/ ∗ / ∗ ∗ indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level.
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by distinct values of the running variable.
Each column reports coefficients and standard errors from the reduced form OLS regression. Dependent variable is a dummy indicating
whether a person commits any traffic offense within a year of her (second) treatment transgression. “Below Cutoff” is the main
explanatory variable and is a dummy equal to one if the treatment transgression occurred within 365 days of the day on which the
penalty for the original transgression had obtained legal force. Such a person is very likely to have her license suspended for 1 month.
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Table 4: Non-Parametric Regression Results
(1) (2)
1-Month Suspension −0.046 −0.046∗
(0.029) (0.019)
Observations Used 13,662 26,714
Selection Algorithm CCT IK
Bandwidth 76.44 152.2
Notes:
+/ ∗ / ∗ ∗ indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses,
clustered by distinct values of the running variable.
Each column reports coefficients and standard errors from a local linear regression discontinuity (RD) model. A triangular
Kernel function was used to construct the estimator. Coefficients yield the effect of a one month license suspension following
the treatment transgression on the probability of committing another major traffic transgression within 1 year. Bandwidth was
selected using algorithms developed by Calonico et al. (2014) (CCT) and Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) (IK), respectively.
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics by Treatment Status
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Recidivism Rate and Offender Characteristics
Treated Non-Compliers Untreated
Recidivism (Any) 0.238 0.261 0.264
Recidivism (Speeding) 0.170 0.190 0.193
Age 42.247 43.765 43.013
Female 0.164 0.155 0.149
Num. Priors 2.027 1.977 1.982
South 0.248 0.169 0.227
North 0.201 0.226 0.209
East 0.162 0.225 0.170
West 0.375 0.344 0.374
Foreign 0.014 0.036 0.020
Observations 12,268 4,603 14,276
Panel B: (Third) Speeding Offenses within 365 days
% <26km/h 0.525 0.493 0.500
% 26-40 km/h 0.384 0.402 0.394
% 40+ km/h 0.091 0.105 0.105
Observations 1,329 637 2,259
Notes: This is a table of means. The treated group consists of offenders who fell
to the left of the 365-day cutoff and consequently had their license suspended for
1 month. Non-compliers are offenders who fell to the left of the 365-day cutoff but
were able to retain their license. Untreated are offenders who fell to the right of
the cutoff and consequently got to keep their license. Panel A shows recidivism
rates and covariate values for each group. Panel B shows relative frequency
of speeding offenses that were committed within 365 days of the penalty for
the second offense obtaining legal force. The category for 26-40km/h excludes
speeding offenses in excess of 30 km/h which were committed in built-up areas.
These offenses are included in the 40+km/h category. Data source is the digital
German traffic registry database as of 30 April 2014.
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Appendix
Table A1: Excerpt from the German Traffic Penalty Catalogue: Speeding Offenses
Penalization
Transgression by: Highways Built-Up Areas
≤ 10 km/h 10e 15e
11 - 15 km/h 20e 25e
16 - 20 km/h 30e 35e
21 - 25 km/h 70e, 1P 80e, 1P
26 - 30 km/h 80e, 3P 100e, 3P
31 - 40 km/h 120e, 3P 160e, 3P, 1M
41 - 50 km/h 160e, 3P, 1M 200e, 4P, 1M
51 - 60 km/h 240e, 4P, 1M 280e, 4P, 2M
61 - 70 km/h 440e, 4P, 2M 480e, 4P, 3M
≥ 71 km/h 600e, 4P, 3M 680e, 4P, 3M
Each cell contains information on the penalization for speed-
ing offenses. There are three types of penalties: Fines as
measured in Euros (e), central registry points (P), and tem-
porary license suspensions in months (M). A person who has
accumulated 18 points will have her license revoked perma-
nently. All points are erased if a person remains without a
traffic transgression for 2 years.
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Table A3: Naive OLS - Effect of License Suspension on Recidivism
(1) (2) (3)
Suspension 0.010∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female −0.074∗∗ −0.079∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Age −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 2,170,728 2,170,079 2,170,079
State Dummies No No Yes
Notes:
+/ ∗ / ∗ ∗ indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10%-level. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
Each column reports coefficients and standard errors from an OLS regression. The estimates in this table are based on the
population of all of the about 2 million offenders who committed a major traffic violation in Germany between May 2012 and
December 2012, some of which were punished with a temporary license suspension. Dependent variable is a dummy that equals
one if a person recidivates within 1 year of an initial traffic transgression. The suspension variable indicates whether a person’s
license was temporarily suspended after the initial traffic transgression.
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Appendix Notes on Generation of Analysis Sample: Figure A1 below illus-
trates which observations can be used for the analysis. The final analysis sample is comprised
of offenders with at least two speeding transgression. One, the so-called “treatment trans-
gression” must have occurred between 1 May 2012 and 1 December 2012 (dashed frame)
thus allowing for a sufficient follow-up period. Another transgression, the so called “original
transgression,” must have occurred prior to the treatment transgression and the penalty for
this original transgression must have obtained legal force between 186 and 545 days before
the date of the treatment transgression. Persons whose transgressions over time are illus-
trated by circles are part of the final sample. Persons whose transgressions over time are
illustrated by triangles do not become part of the final sample. Only observations who have
their treatment transgression within the dashed frame (1 May 2012 or later, but before 1
December 2012) can be used for the analysis.
Person A at the top of Figure A1 whose transgressions over time are illustrated by
triangles has a transgression within the framed time period. But this is her original trans-
gression, not her treatment transgression. Her (second) treatment transgression is outside
the dashed frame, as indicated by a second triangle. Moreover, this person reoffends as there
is yet another triangle further to the right. I might fail to observe this recidivism event,
however, since it takes place after 1 December 2013 and thus may not yet show up in the
data. Person A is therefore excluded from my sample. Person B’s treatment transgression,
on the other hand, falls into the framed area, giving me a sufficiently large time-window to
detect recdivating behavior. In this instance, person B indeed recidivates within 12 months
which I observe. Person C is similar and will also be included in my sample. The main
difference to person B is that person C does not recidivate. Since I allow for a sufficiently
large follow-up period, I can be sure that the lack of another offense for this person is not
due to lagged reporting. Finally, person D and everyone else who has their treatment trans-
gression prior to 1 May 2012, by virtue of the expungement period, must necessarily have
recidivated. Otherwise, they would no longer be in the sample. That is, there is no variation
in the outcome for these observations, leading me to drop person D.
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Figure A1: Data Selection from the Central Traffic Registry
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Figure A2: Speeding Recidivism by Time
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(a) Average Age
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Figure A3: Non-Outcomes by Time
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Figure A5: Treatment Effect by Bandwidth
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Figure A7: Speeding-Specific Recidivism by Follow-Up Window
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